Why Australia Should be Watching New Zealand and Cook Islands Closely

To secure enduring regional partnerships, Australia must prioritise long-term relationship-building and Pacific-led regionalism over transactional agreements and reactionary diplomacy.

The news that Cook Islands will sign a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China has attracted significant attention. Cook Islands has a relationship of “free association” with New Zealand and is obliged to “consult regularly”  on its foreign, defence, and security policy. While New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters had requested to see the proposed partnership agreement, Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown flew to China without providing the document. The New Zealand Foreign Ministry responded that they viewed Cook Islands as “having failed to properly consult,” which was a “matter of significant concern.” This is a challenge for New Zealand, but in many ways, it is Australia who should be most worried.

Australian governments of both persuasions have constructed an Australian-centred security architecture in the Pacific via a network of bilateral security and defence arrangements. Australia signed a bilateral security treaty with Solomon Islands in 2017, Vuvale Partnership with Fiji in 2019 (renewed in 2023), a comprehensive strategic and economic partnership in 2020 and then bilateral security agreement in 2023 with Papua New Guinea (PNG), a security agreement with Vanuatu (now under review) in 2022, the Falepili Union Treaty with Tuvalu in 2023, and a treaty with Nauru in 2024.

Most recently, Australia agreed to contribute AUD$600 million over ten years to support a PNG team entering the Australian NRL competition. In exchange, the PNG government reportedly signed an agreement on “strategic trust,” which provided that Australia could withdraw its funding if PNG does not retain Australia as its major security partner.

Australian governments have been quick to claim these bilateral arrangements as diplomatic wins. But they are the diplomatic equivalent of a Mars Bar: the government gets the sugar-rush of making an announcement, but there is no guarantee that these arrangements will deliver long-term outcomes.

While there are mechanisms to enforce treaties under international law, it is unlikely that either Australia or its Pacific counterparts would do so. Even if Australia, for example, was found to have breached a treaty obligation, we’ve been reminded of the unenforceability of international legal decisions by the war in Gaza. And as the Trump administration has normalised abrogating treaty and other bilateral obligations, an Australian government may conclude that it can bear the shame of doing so. Security agreements have even fewer practical enforcement mechanisms.

Sanctions are the most likely enforcement mechanism, but Australia’s sanctions on Fiji after its 2006 coup illustrate how ineffective they can be. Alternatively, Australia could threaten to withdraw its support—such as banking and development assistance to Nauru—if its Pacific counterpart were perceived to be in breach, such as by striking a deal with China. But this is also unlikely. In an environment of heightened strategic competition, Australia knows that China is likely to step in to the breach.

So, what should Australia do? While electoral politics and the grinding news cycle encourage governments to seek sugar-fixes, Australia needs to do two things.

First, fight short-term transactionalism, which has become more explicit over the last 18 months: on one reading, Australia took advantage of the vulnerabilities of Nauru (economic and banking) and Tuvalu (climate change) to secure treaties and advance its strategic interests. The reported agreement on “strategic trust” is similarly transactional, with PNG’s NRL funding reliant on Australia continuing to be its primary security partner.

Australia has, at different times since colonial settlement, been anxious about French, Dutch, German, Japanese, Soviet, and Libyan influence in the Pacific. In the context of broader strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, Australia currently has legitimate strategic concerns about the much-amplified “China threat.” But regardless of how that threat is eventually resolved, Australia’s geography won’t change. This highlights why Australia should balance pursuing its short-term strategic interests with building long-term relationships.

Our colleagues have reminded us that “relationships are more important than might and money.” Through research with partners in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, we know that Australia’s role in the region is appreciated. But Australia “should feel both pride and humility about its track record.” Importantly, many research participants would prefer that Australia pursue “long-term constructive development approaches over more immediate, ‘flashy’ aid.”

Second, Australia’s focus on bilateral security agreements, combined with new Australian-led regional mechanisms, risks undermining the Pacific Islands Forum and other regional agencies. Pacific leaders have made clear their desire for Pacific-led regionalism.

Recent Australian schemes such as the Pacific Policing Initiative and the Pacific Response Group have responded to regional priorities and have been endorsed by the Pacific Islands Forum and the South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting (PRG). But these initiatives have been instigated, and are largely run and funded by, Australia. While resource and capacity constraints in the Pacific mean that, inevitably, partner countries play a key role in providing assistance, Australian-backed initiatives are often viewed as overreach that undermines Pacific sovereignty.

Australia should therefore centre Pacific-led regional approaches. For example, Australia could work with Pacific Island countries to develop a regional approach to climate migration, rather than linking this opportunity to its strategic interests under the Falepili Union. This might be harder to sell domestically, but the Australian public are capable of grasping well-explained policy decisions, particularly if efforts are made to improve understanding of the Pacific in Australia.

Given the importance of domestic issues in Pacific countries, including the rising cost of living, corruption, the state of law and order, and the impact of climate change, Australia must also realise that it is difficult for Pacific Island countries to “pick a side.” Indeed, many influential Pacific leaders have visited China and been impressed by its development model. Many also see the ability to enter into economic and other arrangements with China and other partners as an important demonstration of their independence.

Rather than continuing its security arrangement “arms race” with China, Australia would be better trying to facilitate partner countries—including China—engaging through regional mechanisms. China has traditionally been reluctant to take this approach, as it views many regional institutions—particularly the Pacific Islands Forum—as overly influenced by Australia and New Zealand, as well as complicated by the continued recognition of Taiwan by Tuvalu, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. But at least Australia will have demonstrated that it takes seriously the Pacific’s desire to be a “zone of peace,” and regional mechanisms are likely to achieve more buy-in than bilateral or Australian-led ones.

Sugar-rushes only last for a short time. Cook Islands’ move is a reminder that the Australian government needs to think creatively about its Pacific policy before the sugar-crash hits.

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