The United Nations: a flawed instrument
Zinzan Goertzen, winner of the NZIIA Prize for best undergraduate essay on international relations at Te Herenga Waka Victoria University of Wellington
2024-01-01
GEOPOLITICS
This essay was published in New Zealand International Review, 49:1, 2024
The theory of neo-realism holds that the United Nations is largely impotent in maintaining peace and security in this post-Cold War era. The United Nations has been ignored, paralysed and dismissed by self-interested states who do not stand to gain from co-operating with the organisation. This essay briefly details the theoretical framework of neo-realism and, using this theory, analyses the United Nations’ relevance in upholding peace and security. Initially, this analysis outlines how the UN Security Council has failed at its primary responsibilities when these responsibilities conflict with the interests of powerful states or provides them no interest, and how its successes are merely coincidental of powerful states acting in their interests. The latter part of this analysis addresses the United Nations’ normative authority in promoting peace and security, and how international obligations are only significant when they enhance state security.
Neo-realism assumes states are the main actors in international politics where the international system determines their behaviour. This system is fundamentally characterised by neo-realists to be anarchical — there is no organising authority above states to regulate and enforce state behaviour. Neo-realists assume all states are interested in survival, yet within an anarchial system this survival is not ensured. Understood to be unitary rational actions, states must rely upon themselves to accumulate power for their security. Neo-realists contend that this accumulation will fuel other states’ anxieties as the distribution of state capabilities shifts, creating a ‘security dilemma’ where states compete in maximising relative gains in security.[i]
States accumulate power through internal or external balancing, or more infrequently, ‘band wagoning’. Internal balancing happens when a state increases economic, military and/or other capabilities; external balancing occurs when a state enters alliance(s) against more powerful states or alliances.[ii] Still, neo-realism is cynical about the sustainability of co-operation because it rarely provides each state uniform gains in a system characterised by mistrust and insecurity. ‘Band wagoning’ occurs when smaller states follow the greatest power, rather than opposing them. Neo-realists assert that this only occurs when there are limited allies to balance against larger states/alliances, and an alliance between weaker and stronger states will bring mutual benefits.[iii]
Neo-realists reject the United Nations’ relevance in maintaining peace and security. Within neo-realism theory, inter-governmental organisations can only function when it is in the interests of states; otherwise, states will directly compete with the organisation.[iv] Circumscribed to powerful states’ interests in a system of unsustainable co-operation, organisations are seen to lack independent agency. Consequently, neo-realists conclude the United Nations as ineffective in upholding peace and security when their attempts do not correlate with or comes at the expense of powerful states’ relative gains. This is particularly apparent when focusing on the Security Council.
Primary responsibility
The Security Council, a principal organ of the United Nations, has primary responsibility for ensuring international peace and security. It is composed of five permanent members (the P5) — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — alongside ten non-permanent members.[v] These members typically have greater capabilities than non-member states, with the P5 reflecting the distribution of power at the time of the United Nations’ inception. Within the United Nations, only the Security Council can enact binding resolutions on member states. All its decisions require nine-members’ support, which includes all of the P5 who can veto any resolution.[vi]
Neo-realists assume that the P5 will utilise their veto capabilities to disable the Security Council from upholding its primary responsibilities when these responsibilities conflict with their relative security. For instance, the on-going Syrian Civil War. The UN Human Rights Office estimates that over 300,000 civilians have been killed in Syria since its 2011 outbreak. There are also substantive allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Despite this, Russia has vetoed almost all resolutions proposed by the Security Council.[vii] This demonstrates the neo-realist assumption that intergovernmental organisations are confined to the interests of powerful states. Russia has major strategic and energy interests in Syria, and the current Syrian regime is a major buyer of Russian weaponry. The fall of the current regime may also allow the consummation of the Qatar gas pipeline. This pipeline would reduce European dependence of Russia for gas,[viii] threatening Russia’s relative security in the international structure. Consequently, Russia is exercising its veto abilities because Security Council attempts to maintain peace and security will come at the expense of its interests.
Conversely, the Security Council failed in respect to the Rwandan Genocide (6 April 1994–15 July 1994) due to lack of state interest. Many states were aware of the crisis before it had even begun, and the Security Council was officially informed on 31 May 1994 that 250,000 to 500,000 Rwandans had been killed.[ix] Despite this knowledge, no action was taken until late June.[x] Neo-realism contends that this is because it was in no member states’ interest to act. The United States, for example, minimised the crisis to other UN member states because it was unwilling to risk its own military resources.[xi] As another example, France politically and militarily supported the genocidal Hutu regime.[xii] While France is heavily responsible for the eventual intervention, France only acted to assist the losing francophone Hutu regime against the anglophone Rwandan Patriotic Front — not to end the genocide. The French feared a loss of African influence to America or Britain, thereby threatening its security.[xiii] Over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed in the crisis.[xiv]
Coincidental attempts
Neo-realists concede, however, that Security Council attempts at maintaining peace and security can be coincidental of state interests. This is exemplified by the Security Council’s handling of Afghanistan’s Taliban government that harboured the terrorist group responsible for the 9/11 terror attack, al-Qaeda. In late 2001, the Security Council approved resolutions that: recognised the right and security of individual and collective self-defence; and authorised the US-led invasion of Afghanistan.[xv] This invasion toppled the Taliban government. Some argue this successful joint action in maintaining peace and security challenges neo-realist assumptions that the international system is anarchial, and that co-operation is weak among states.[xvi] Neo-realism, however, understands this to be a case of states ‘band wagoning’ behind the United States. It was in the mutual interests of most states to prevent further attacks similar to 9/11 by installing and supporting a co-operative government,[xvii] and there were no states/alliances powerful enough to successfully balance against the United States. For neo-realists, this success was only possible because states allowed it to be.
Nevertheless, neo-realists contend that powerful states will ignore the Security Council and its attempts at peace and security if co-operation is not in their interests. For instance, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. This invasion was widely considered illegitimate by the Security Council — of its fifteen member-states, only the United States, UK, Spain, and Bulgaria supported invasion.[xviii] The United States and its allies declared war on Iraq, nonetheless. According to neo-realism, the United States stood to gain more from invasion than from co-operation. By invading Iraq, the United States could: secure access to oil; remove a growing threat by preventing Iraq’s assent to a nuclear weapon state; and establish regional military bases.[xix] Co-operation did not provide such gains nor ensure US security. Rationally, the United States ignored the Security Council and its attempts at peace and security.
Despite the shortcomings of the Security Council, however, the United Nations has successfully co-ordinated the setting of norms and laws designed to protect peace and security. For example, the organisation has formed a shared understanding among states as to what use of force is legitimate — when used in self-defence or authorised by the Security Council for peace enforcement — and codified it into international law. [xx] Breach of this international law can result in coordinated sanctions, condemnation, or humanitarian intervention against the offending state. Such was the case of the Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, which was largely met with condemnation, and co-ordinated sanctions by the United States and European Union.[xxi]
Pivotal position
The United Nations has also been pivotal in the international adoption of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principle. Universally accepted by all UN member states in 2005,[xxii] the principle holds that states must protect individuals from war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and genocide. When a state fails to do so, humanitarian intervention is legitimised. This norm has been significant in the United Nations’ attempts to maintain peace and security. Following its 2007 disputed elections, Kenya experienced an uproar of ethnic violence — some 1500 were killed with over 300,000 displaced. Upholding ‘Responsibility to Protect’, the United Nations and international community took diplomatic action and quelled the crisis.[xxiii] This example puts doubt on the neorealist assumption that states are solely interested in relative gains; and demonstrates a general agreement among states that intervention should be taken to prevent atrocities — a significant success for the United Nations in maintaining peace and security.
Still, neo-realists doubt the relevance of international obligations in sustaining peace and security. For neo-realists, international norms and laws are feeble. They only matter when they enhance the security of powerful states; otherwise, they hold no authority and are able to be ignored. The US invasion of Iraq was generally regarded as illegal; however, the United States did not suffer any sanctions nor humanitarian intervention. While met with international condemnation,[xxiv] this was irrelevant to the relative gains it made through its ‘illegitimate’ actions. The case of Crimea is similar. The international reaction did not result in military intervention against Russia, revert Crimea to Ukraine, nor prevent a Russian advance in 2022. Neo-realists contend that the consequences of breaching international law were offset by its security gains: Russia was able to get greater access to the black sea and military ownership over a city home to its crucial naval base.[xxv]
Furthermore, ‘Responsibility to Protect’ has been both ignored and subjected to issues of veto. Since 2003, the war in Darfur has caused the death of hundreds of thousands and displaced millions, with the acting government carrying out ethnic cleansings.[xxvi] While warranting humanitarian intervention, the Security Council was very reluctant to approve peacekeeping in the region until mid-2008.[xxvii] Furthermore, these peacekeepers have largely failed to protect civilians and have dwindled in numbers since 2018 as the United Nations prepares to leave.[xxviii] Neo-realism considers the failure of the United Nations and ‘Responsibility to Protect’ a result of little state interest — no state stood to gain in upholding peace and security within Darfur. Consequently, there was little political will to uphold ‘Responsibility to Protect’. The Syrian Civil War aforementioned has also warranted humanitarian intervention under ‘Responsibility to Protect’,[xxix] however, intervention has largely failed due to the veto function and conflicting interests.
Through the theory of neo-realism, it can be surmised that the United Nations is ineffective in upholding peace and security. The Security Council, the UN body tasked with such a responsibility, is confined to interests of powerful states, which infrequently correspond with its obligations. Self-interested states have vetoed resolutions, ignored crises, and disregarded the Security Council. Furthermore, analysis holds that the norms established by the United Nations to promote peace and security, while having irregular successes, lack the authority to be consistently enforced and upheld within an anarchial system. Neo-realism concludes that the United Nations is circumscribed to the interests of states and struggles to enforce peace and security.
The NZIIA essay prize was established at Te Herenga Waka Victoria University of Wellington in 2014. It encourages and recognises undergraduate excellence in the study of international relations, consistent with the NZIIA's long-standing commitment to enhancing New Zealanders' understanding of international issues. It is awarded on the recommendation of the head of the School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations in consultation with the academic staff and head of programme in Political Science and International Relations. For further details see www.wgtn.ac.nz/scholarships/annual-prizes/current/nziia-prize-in-international-relations.
Notes
[i] Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, ‘Realism’, in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds), The Globalization of World Politics (Oxford,2020), pp.137–8, 140.
[ii] Joseph M. Parent and Sebastian Rosato, ‘Balancing in Neorealism’, International Security, vol 40, no 2 (2015), p.51.
[iii] Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Ontario, 1979), pp.126–7.
[iv] Endalcachew Bayeh, ‘Theories on the of international organizations in maintaining peace and security’, International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development, vol 1, no 7 (2014), pp.348–9.
[v] ‘United Nations Charter’ (www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text).
[vi] Devon E.A. Curtis and Paul Taylor, ‘The United Nations’, in Baylis, Smith and Owens, p.336.
[vii] P.M. Butchard, The Responsibility to Protect and the Failures of the United Nations Security Council (Oxford, 2020), pp.44–5.
[viii] Manzoor Khan Afridi and Ali Jibran, ‘Russian Response to Syrian Crisis’, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, vol 38, no 2 (2018), p.70.
[ix] Des Forges, ‘Response: Rationalising Western Apathy on Rwanda’, Foreign Affairs, vol 79, no 3 (2000), p.141; ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Rwanda’ (digitallibrary.un.org/record/197779?ln=en).
[x] Carol McQueen, Humanitarian Intervention and Safety Zones: Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda (London, 2005), p.137.
[xi] Forges, pp.141–4.
[xii] Linda Melvern, A people betrayed: The role of the west in Rwanda’s genocide (London, 2000), p.49.
[xiii] McQueen, p.130.
[xiv] Butchard, p.19.
[xv] Report of the Government Inquiry into Operation Burnham and related matters, pp.40–1 (operationburnham.inquiry.govt.nz/inquiry-report/#PDF); Suresh Kumar and Meha Pant, ‘UN Involvement in Afghanistan’, World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues, vol 18, no 3 (2014), pp.126–8.
[xvi] Anette Sonnback, ‘How Successful Has the UN Been in Maintaining International Peace and Security?’ (www.e-ir.info/2020/11/08/how-successful-has-the-un-been-in-maintaining-international-peace-and-security/).
[xvii] Kumar and Pant, pp.125–9.
[xviii] Ronan Bennett, ‘Ten days to war’, Guardian, 8 Mar 2008.
[xix] Daniel Lieberfeld, ‘Theories of Conflict and the Iraq War’, International Journal of Peace Studies, vol 10, no 2 (2005), pp.2–5.
[xx] UN Charter.
[xxi] Helene Sjursen and Guri Rosén, ‘Arguing Sanctions: On the EU’s Response to the Crisis in Ukraine’, in Mai’a K. Davis Cross and Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski (eds), European-Russian Power Relations in Turbulent Times (Ann Arbor, 2021), p.59.
[xxii] Christina G. Badescu and Linear Bergholm, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Conflict in Darfur: The Big Let-Down’, Security Dialogue, vol 40, no 3 (2009), p.302.
[xxiii] Alex J. Bellamy and Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Humanitarian intervention in world politic’, in Baylis, Smith and Owens, p.523.
[xxiv] Christian Reus-Smit, ‘International law’, in Baylis, Smith and Owens, p.312.
[xxv] Tanvi Chauhan, ‘Why are Warm-Water Ports Important to Russian Security?’, European, Middle Eastern & African Affair, vol 2, no 2 (2020), pp.73–4.
[xxvi] Badescu and Bergholm, pp.287–95.
[xxvii] Ibid., pp.291–2.
[xxviii] ‘UN confirms closure of Darfur peacekeeping mission’, United Nations News (news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1081122).
[xxix] Bellamy and Wheeler, p.525.
Membership
NZIIA membership is open to anyone interested in understanding the importance of global affairs to the political and economic well-being of New Zealand.