India’s never-ending quest for global status

Running up to the annual United Nations General Assembly leaders meeting, renewed debates broke out in New Delhi about India’s quest to have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Old wounds reopened amid claims that India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru gave up the opportunity for a permanent seat when he was made an offer, which Nehru rejected on the grounds that Beijing should get first dibs – although there is limited evidence that Washington or Moscow ever made any serious attempt to pursue this.

Any discussion about India’s global aspirations inevitably raises the issue of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. In an interview in 2023, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi said, “How can it (the UNSC) claim to speak for the world when its most populous country, and its largest democracy, is not a permanent member?” The head of one of India’s leading think-tanks has even referred to Security Council reform as the starting point for any discussion about reform of multilateral institutions – this despite the UN’s marginal role during recent and ongoing global crises.

The debate alludes to a broader objective of Indian foreign policy rooted in a never-ending quest to gain greater status and recognition on the world stage. Every global conference India hosts or attends – from its G20 presidency to its bid to host the 2036 Olympics – or every win – from Miss World/ Universe pageants to its mission to the Moon – and every statistic – from being the world’s fastest-growing major economy to one-sixth of the world’s population – are touted as signs of its greatness.

The Lowy Institute’s most recent Asia Power Index, which has elevated India to third place (behind the United States and China) in terms of its comprehensive power, has also been lauded as a sign of India’s growing importance. (This achievement is made sweeter by India’s longstanding adversary, Pakistan dropping from 15th to 16th place on the index while China’s position is plateauing).

However, a key component of “comprehensive national power” measured in the Asia Power Index is the ability to shape the external environment, including influencing other states and global events. Recent developments in South Asia where leaders that hold less favourable views of India have come to power in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives (not counting India’s “all-weather” rivalry with Pakistan), illustrate India’s limited ability to influence states within its own neighbourhood (although New Delhi’s recent financial assistance to the Maldives and Sri Lanka also illustrates a gap between the anti-India rhetoric of many of these countries and the reality of maintaining engagement with India as the dominant regional power).

On influencing events, consider India’s stance on key global flashpoints in Ukraine and the Middle East. What solutions has India brought to the table? Aside from Modi’s photo opportunities with the Ukrainian and Palestinian leadership at the UN and much quoted statements – that now is “not an era of war” and that India is “on the side of peace” with respect to the Ukraine conflict – India’s substantive actions have been limited and largely driven by self-interest. India has referred to itself as a “Vishwamitra” or a friend to the world. But there is a difference between being a friend to the world and helping the world make friends with each other.

Of course, the question arises that if the United States and China cannot de-escalate these conflicts, what hope is there for India to do so? But this overlooks the fact that India played a prominent role during previous global conflicts when it was a much weaker power. This included important mediating roles during the Korean War and French-Indochina war, as well as Taiwan Strait crises in the 1950s.

How does this compare with India’s position on today’s flashpoints? Despite having close relations with both Russia and the United States, India has had a limited role in diplomacy around the Ukraine conflict. Close ties with both Iran and Israel have not gone beyond a limited role for India in the Middle East. Ditto in de-escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula, despite holding diplomatic relations with both North and South Korea. This is in spite of India having a vested interest in all three conflicts, with continued dependence on Russian military hardware and energy, oil and gas imports from the Middle East, and the longstanding symbiotic relationship between Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and North Korea’s ballistic missile program (evidenced by the legacy of the AQ Khan network).

So, it is unclear what India intends to do with a seat at the global high table aside from claims of being a “voice of the Global South” and seeking a more equitable distribution of power. While India has risen up the ranking of the Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index, it is also apparent that it is a chronic underachiever. This is evidenced by the difference in its ranking on “Future Resources” (reflecting future potential) – where it has shown the greatest improvement – and the negative “Power Gap” (reflecting a gap between its potential and current influence) – where it is among the worst performers in the region.

India is not unique among countries in seeking to elevate its global status. However, India’s quest for global recognition comes with the added baggage of reviving its status as a civilisational state. This perception that India needs to correct historical injustices and reclaim former glory combines hubris with a sense of being aggrieved. Other countries on this path – most recently China – have tended to pursue aggressive foreign policies.

This is not to say that India will pursue its own form of “wolf warrior diplomacy”. So far, India has demonstrated a proclivity to project a more benign worldview that is non-Western but not explicitly anti-Western (unlike China, Russia, or Iran). However, as India continues to acquire more power and influence, it will also become more prone to retaliating to actions that challenge its status.

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