European strategic autonomy, courtesy of Trump

France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, and Italy – the five biggest military spenders in Europe – met for the fourth time last week since the election of Donald Trump under what they refer to as the E5 format. They discussed support to Ukraine and concrete ways to strengthen European security and defence, including changing national and EU regulations to step up weapons production and procurement.

This was not the only noteworthy development in the last couple of weeks. Meeting in Brussels on 6 March, the 27 EU leaders also endorsed the European Commission’s “Rearm Europe” plan in what European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen called a “watershed moment for Europe”. Greece’s Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis summarised this well when he explained, “in these crucial times, the strategic autonomy of the European Union must be a non-negotiable priority”. The plan aims to mobilise an additional €800 million in defence spending, including €150 million for loans to encourage members to undertake common defence projects.

Additionally, French President Emmanuel Macron has taken an extra step and introduced the idea that the French nuclear arsenal – which is fully sovereign and not reliant on any other countries (unlike the British arsenal, which relies on US technical input) – could be used under French control to extend protection to other European countries.

These developments underscore a remarkable shift in Europe to act towards the common defence of the continent, something previously thought impossible without the help of the United States.

All this seemed unimaginable only months ago. With the exception of a handful of key initiatives, such as the adoption in 2022 of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence or the establishment in 2024 of the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIPRA), not much progress had been made in terms of developing European strategic autonomy, and there was still an overreliance on NATO and the United States. Until now.

This groundbreaking shift benefits from a strong consensus within Europe (except for Hungarian President Viktor Orbán). However, it will not be easy and won’t happen overnight. Many questions also remain unanswered – in particular, what form this “European strategic autonomy” will take and what level of European sovereignty is really being discussed here.

What is noteworthy, however, is that this “watershed moment”’ is not due to new threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin or other dictators, but to the fact that Trump’s America is no longer seen as a reliable ally. Trump’s constant attacks on NATO and claims that “If they don’t pay, I’m not going to defend them” have raised increasing concerns, along with threats that Greenland, a Danish territory, will be American “one way or another”. But it was Trump’s attempt to strongarm and humiliate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office and the subsequent suspension of military aid and intelligence-sharing to Kyiv that appeared to be the last straw.

But the United States could have a lot to lose in addition to the diplomatic fallout. Economic repercussions could follow if European leaders decide to favour European (and other) providers for their military equipment rather than American ones. Between 2020 and 2024, 64% of arms imported by EU NATO members came from the United States. Calls to stay clear of American-made F-35s and to pursue instead European planes such as the Eurofighter Typhoon have featured in the European press over recent weeks based on the fear that the United States could still prevent F-35s from taking off even after they have been handed over to their owners. This comes at a time when the American economy is already shaken by the repercussions of its tariffs on Canada, Mexico and on aluminium and steel. Allies have also started questioning whether some restrictions on intelligence-sharing should be put in place.

Trump has tried to shift the blame for this deterioration in transatlantic relations to others. He has blamed Zelenskyy, and has argued that NATO’s alliance was one-sided since France and “a couple of others” would not honour the collective security provision under Article 5 of the NATO treaty if the United States were in trouble.

But it is undeniable that this shift has been made possible by Trump’s highly transactional foreign policy, the rapprochement between the United States and Russia under Trump, and the associated (mis)treatment of Ukraine.

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