State of Emergency in New Caledonia: A challenging dilemma

Riots erupted in Nouméa on 13 May 2024.

Three days later France declared a state of emergency, sending hundreds of troops to restore order. These events were precipitated by French President Emmanuel Macron’s decision to adjust the electoral roll that had been established under the 1998 Nouméa Accord, which set up three independence referendums, all won by pro-France loyalists (albeit controversially in the most recent). However, the seeds for the unrest in May had been growing for several decades. The chasm between independentists and loyalists remains as wide as it has been for a long time. A new agreement is urgently needed.

New Caledonia’s demography of 268,000 inhabitants is politically challenging.1 Roughly two-fifths are settlers from France, one-fifth are immigrants from Asia and the Pacific and two-fifths are indigenous Kanaks. Decades of negotiations between pro- French loyalists, independentists and the French government have proved inconclusive. The Nouméa Accord in 1998 was the latest political landmark. This arrangement mandated a transfer of significant powers to France’s overseas territory and set up three independence referendums. The first two referendums produced a narrow win for the pro-France loyalists, but the Kanak independentists boycotted the third, resulting in an over- whelming pro-France result. The Kanaks have refused to accept the validity of this final referendum.

The Nouméa Accord also established an electoral roll for New Caledonia’s provincial elections. The roll limited participation to people who were born in New Caledonia or who had lived there since 1998 or earlier. The aim of the roll was to pro- vide numerical parity between the loyalists and the independentists. However, in late 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed to allow people with only ten years’ residence in New Caledonia to vote in the provincial elections. The new electorate would have added an extra 25,000 eligible voters and potentially swung two or three seats at each election to the pro-French loyalist parties, preventing the pro-independence parties from retaining a majority in Congress.² This proposal, described as ‘tone deaf’ by critics, in May 2024 triggered rioting, bloodshed, destruction and economic hardship.

Underlying causes
While the riots were triggered by Macron’s decision to adjust the electoral roll, the seeds for the unrest had been growing for several decades. Two of the most recent were the unsatisfactory independence referendum in 2021, and the appointment of hardline loyalist Sonia Backès, president of New Caledonia’s South Province, as a member of the French government in 2022. Kanak leaders urged France to provide a different path- way towards independence. Instead, France proposed to change the electoral roll unilaterally, without addressing the independence leaders’ fundamental concerns.

On 13 May 2024, ahead of a vote on the electoral roll change in France’s National Assembly, the New Caledonian capital Nouméa and its surrounds were the scene of blockades, carjackings, looting, arson and shootings. Initially, around 30 shops and factories were set on fire. Supermarkets and car dealerships were ransacked and shots were fired at security forces. Social media showed images of mainly youthful rioters waving the Kanaky flag, reflecting the growing nationalism of a generation born after the Nouméa Accord.³

On 16 May, France declared a state of emergency for the first time in 40 years. Hundreds of troops were sent from France to restore order. The number of gendarmes, police and military personnel reached an unprecedented 7000. All gatherings, demonstrations, the sale of alcohol, the carrying of weapons and the use of TikTok were banned. A curfew was imposed, and the main airport and schools were closed. The unrest continued and escalated into exchanges of gunfire between police and armed rioters.⁴ The death toll as of 2 December 2024 was thirteen, including eleven Kanaks and two gendarmes. There have been 169 people injured and 2235 arrests.⁵ On 22 May, Macron visited New Caledonia and urged all parties to reach an agreement. On 27 May, he lifted the state of emergency. The New Caledonian economy emerged from the riots on the brink of collapse. Around 800 businesses had been looted or destroyed. This has resulted in the loss of more than 20,000 jobs. The total economic cost has been estimated at around €2.2 billion. Since the riots, the French government has given about €400 million to New Caledonia. This is on top of the €1.5 billion New Caledonia usually receives each year. New Caledonia's Congress has asked the French government for €4.2 billion to be distributed over the next five years to rebuild the economy. 6

International reaction
On 20 August 2024, the United Nations put out a strongly word- ed statement concerning New Caledonia, which condemned the actions of France before and during the riots. In part it read:

We are very concerned by the absence of dialogue, the excessive use of force, the ongoing deployment of military forces and the continued reports of human rights violations that have targeted thousands of Kanak Indigenous People for taking part in protests… [T]he French National Assembly adopted on 14 May 2024 a bill modifying the composition of electoral body, blowing up one of the corner stones of the Nouméa Accord which is precisely the freezing of the electoral body of New Caledonia.⁷

In November 2024, the Pacific Islands Forum (of which New Caledonia is a member) sent three Pacific prime ministers to New Caledonia on a mission to assess the political impasse, support the de-escalation of violence and promote dialogue between all parties. The mission discovered that anxiety after the riots was high, with concern about how much extra funding France would be able to supply to rebuild the economy and how much of this funding would be a loan.⁸ During the visit, the forum members discussed ways to incorporate New Caledonia into the Pacific region more fully. New Caledonian business leaders acknowledged that the local economy had shrunk substantially following the riots, and companies would need to look abroad to sell their products. The forum is expected to submit a report on their visit, but that will not be until the next annual Forum Leaders’ Summit in the Solomon Islands in September 2025.⁹

The two biggest countries in the Pacific Islands Forum, Australia and New Zealand, have had different responses to the crisis. Australian leaders have declined to comment directly. New Zealand, in contrast, has been forthright in its criticism of the French government’s approach to the independence movement. New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters called into question the legitimacy of the last referendum, which was boy- cotted by Kanaks, saying while the vote was technically lawful it was not reflective of the spirit of the referendum process. New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon spoke to President Macron at the July 2024 NATO Summit in Washington DC, ex- pressing the need for involvement of the Pacific Islands Forum in the crisis.10

China’s opportunity
China has courted New Caledonia’s independence leaders for many years and would see an independent New Caledonia as a win for its initiatives in the South Pacific. France’s moves to derail the independence process by changing the electoral roll would have deeply concerned China. Conversely, if France were to lose any of its Pacific territories, its global influence and status in the region would decline significantly. The rioting in New Caledonia hurt France’s plan to counter China’s influence in the Pacific by strengthening its overseas territories.11

New Caledonia has become increasingly dependent on China for its exports. It is China’s second-largest supplier of nickel. In 2011, New Caledonia’s trade to China was 6.9 per cent of total exports. By 2022, 62.3 per cent of all New Caledonia’s exports were going to China. Macron has attempted to secure nickel from New Caledonia for France’s clean-energy shift, and to compete against China in manufacturing electric vehicles. However, this initiative was interrupted by the riots and by pro-independence leaders who have called the idea a colonial strategy to regain control of New Caledonia’s resources.12

It is expected that China will continue to ingratiate itself with independence party leaders and other key influencers of the independence movement. China is also anticipated to make efforts to get a firmer foothold in the nickel market through direct investment and becoming an even more significant importer of the resource. Meanwhile, France and the loyalists will attempt to counter China’s influence as an importer of and investor in New Caledonian nickel reserves.

What happens now? In September 2024, recognising that taking electoral parity away from the independentists would likely cause more violence, the French government abandoned the proposal to broaden the electoral roll. Two months later France announced that leaders of both the Senate and National Assembly would visit New Caledonia for negotiations regarding the political and institutional future status of the French Pacific overseas territory.13 The next political milestone is the provincial elections, due to be held before December 2025. But the demographic and political issues plaguing New Caledonia remain, and the provincial elections are unlikely to resolve them.

One hopeful development is that the more moderate pro- independence parties have stated that, while reaching full sovereignty remained a key goal, they may also accept a type of shared sovereignty with France. This is sometimes referred to as independence-in-association. But staunch independentists have argued that any political agreement must include a clear pathway towards independence. It is unclear whether the radical pro-independence parties would accept a shared independence with France. The New Caledonian loyalists want the economy to be salvaged and public infrastructure to be re- constructed; and they want New Caledonia to remain a French territory.14

The chasm between independentists and loyalists remains as wide as it has been for decades. It is highly unlikely the loyalists will agree to a pathway to independence or that the Kanaks will give up their dream of independence. Moderates hope for a compromise, some sort of independence-in-association, where New Caledonia would continue to receive financial and geo- political support from France.

In my view, France should consider a replacement for the Nouméa Accord and devise a clear pathway towards some form of independence for the territory. With the process of the final independence referendum locally disputed and internationally condemned, a new agreement appears to be the only way to appease the independentists, who otherwise will continue to protest. However, an independent New Caledonia would serve China’s geopolitical interests. It is likely China would strengthen its influence by means of strategic investments in New Caledonia. This would reduce the influence of Australia, New Zealand, France and Western partner countries. This dilemma poses a challenge to regional leaders.

Dr Sarah Bradley recently earned her doctorate from the University of Auckland, based on years of field research and interviews in New Caledonia. She is a veteran news presenter for TVNZ and RNZ National and a former diplomat.

NOTES
1. Adrian Muckle, ‘No More Violence nor War: 20 Years of Nation- Building in New Caledonia’, Journal of Pacific History, vol 44, no 2 (2009), pp.179–94 (doi:10.1080/00223340903142124).
2. Elisabeth Alber, ‘New Caledonia: a Promising Attempt to Constitutionalize a Sovereignty Conflict Going Wrong’, Perspectives on Federalism, vol 16, no 1 (2024), p.12.
3. Nic Maclellan, ‘Crisis in New Caledonia’, The Development Policy Centre Blog, 17 May 2024 (devpolicy.org/crisis-in-new-caledonia/).
4. Nic Maclellan, ‘France declares state of emergency in New Caledonia’, Islands Business, 16 May 2024.
5. ‘France: UN experts alarmed by situation of Kanak Indigenous Peoples in the Non-Self-Governing Territory of New Caledonia’, United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, 20 Aug 2024.
6. Patrick Decloitre and Caleb Fotheringham, ‘France injects 130 million euros to keep New Caledonia’s economy afloat’, RNZ Pacific (Auckland), 6 Sep 2024 (www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific- news/527244/france-injects-130-million-euros-to-keep-new-cale donia-s-economy-afloat).
7. ‘Statement of the United Nations experts on the rights of Kanak Indigenous People in the Non-Self-Governing Territory of New Caledonia and the Nouméa Accord’, United Nations, 20 Aug 2024.
8. Don Wiseman, ‘What is the outcome of Pacific Islands Forum lead- ers fact-finding mission to New Caledonia?’, RNZ Pacific, 6 Nov 2024.
9. Patrick Decloitre. ‘Forum troika’s visit highlights value of regionalism for New Caledonia’, RNZ Pacific, 30 Oct 2024 (www.rnz.co.nz/inter national/pacific-news/532356/forum-troika-s-visit-highlights-value- of-regionalism-for-new-caledonia).
10. Ben McKay, ‘Pacific Islands Forum “troika” Heads to New Caledonia’, AAP General News Wire (Sydney), 23 Jul 2024.
11. Anne-Marie Brady, ‘When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Aug 2024.
12. Mathew Dalton and Sam Schechner, ‘Behind New Caledonia’s Ri- ots, a Fight Over Vast Reserves of Nickel’, Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones Institutional News, New York, 19 May 2024.
13. Patrick Decloitre, ‘Top French Parliament duo in New Caledonia for three days’, RNZ Pacific, 12 Nov 2024 (www.rnz.co.nz/international/ pacific-news/533497/top-french-parliament-duo-in-new-caledonia- for-three-days).
14. Nic Maclellan, ‘Overseas Minister buffeted by New Caledonia crisis’,
Islands Business, 24 Oct 2024.

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